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Abstract 
In this paper, we use OLS, IV-2SLS and Control Function regression methods on cross-sectional 
data to analyze effects of social interactions among smallholder farmers in rural Kenya on 
demand for fertilizers and on farm yields. The main finding is that social interactions have large 
effects on demand for fertilizer and on its return. The interactions are also found to significantly 
influence returns to basic farm inputs, notably land, farm equipment, and labor. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In smallholder agriculture, farmers do not always possess full information when making 
decisions. They partially overcome this problem of information asymmetry by learning from 
neighbors, peers or extension officers. The learning takes place during social interactions or from 
inferences made from observing other farmers’ production activities. Through such interactions, 
a farmer may gather new ideas on farming (Munshi, 2004). This process is known as learning 
through word-of-mouth. 
In the absence of a local extension agent or an informed farmer to provide precise and 
unbiased estimates of expected crop yield, a smallholder farmer may observe his neighbor’s 
activities regarding usage of inputs and production of farm produce and form opinions about 
particular aspects of farming (Conley and Udry, 2001; Munshi, 2004; Eisenkopf, 2010). Past 
observations of a neighbor’s actions regarding inputs usage, e.g., the acreage planted or the 
European Scientific Journal          July edition vol. 8, No.15   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)    e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
181 
 
amount of fertilizer applied and the outcome thereof may provide insights from which current 
input decisions can be made. A neighbor’s previous input usage and plot-level outcomes when 
observed properly and repeatedly may provide credible basis for social learning by observation 
(Munshi, 2004). Thus, neighbors’ experiences with inputs can importantly influence a farmer’s 
decision-making process.  
In an extreme case, a farmer may make decisions solely on information learnt from 
neighbors and completely ignore his own experience or private information (Banerjee, 1992). 
Were this to happen, the neighbors’ and the farmer’s own experiences would be perfect 
substitutes in the process of making decisions about technology choice. 
However, there are cases when a neighbor’s experiences may not be useful to an observing 
farmer even though observed. If the neighbors’ decisions are functions of unobserved 
characteristics peculiar to him, social learning breaks down because such characteristics are not 
available to an observing farmer. 
Ellison and Fudenburg (1995) propose a rule of thumb that individuals only learn 
gainfully from neighbors with characteristics similar to theirs.  If that is the case, then farmers 
only learn from peers. Peer farmers are neighbors that a given farmer interacts with. To that 
extent, individual characteristics of interacting neighbors are important determinants of an 
individual farmer’s knowledge in agriculture and his crop yields (Munshi, 2004).  
A farmer may also take into account average village level yields in the past to make 
current decisions on input usage on his own plot as well as in updating his own estimates of 
expected yields. Thus, neighbors’ experiences with inputs can importantly influence a farmer’s 
decision-making process. Their previous decisions and plot-level outcomes may provide credible 
basis for social learning when observed properly and repeatedly by a farmer. 
In the absence of social learning, a farmer will tend to experiment on his plot in a bid to 
generate information that he desires. Social learning, therefore, saves on costs of experimenting. 
The disadvantage of social learning is that it curtails generation of new information that could 
emerge from further field trials (Munshi, 2004). 
In certain situations, a farmer may adopt a new technology, e.g., growing a new maize 
variety, just because his neighbors are growing the variety. The farmer is influenced by the 
adoption rate in the surrounding area. This behavior is characteristic of social influence (Hogset 
and Barret, 2010). Social influence does not entail social learning since the influenced farmer 
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lacks details of the technology, and his adoption behavior is based on general perceptions (Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 1996). 
For social interactions with neighbors to result in social learning, there must be 
distinguishable change in a farmer’s productivity (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996). Social learning 
provides positive information externalities that should be reflected in an increase in a farmer’s 
productivity. Social interactions occur whenever one farmer in a network affects other farmers’ 
choices directly without the intermediation of the market (Hartmann et al., 2008). They lead to 
social effects on members of a defined group. A reference group in smallholder farming would 
be that set of other farmers whose behavior affects the focal farmer.  At a micro level, a reference 
group could be a neighborhood or a village (Ellison and Fudenburg, 1995).  
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Conley and Udry (2001), Munshi (2004) and Bandiera 
and Rasul (2006) show that a farmer’s initial decision to adopt a new technology is influenced by 
decisions taken by others in his or her social network of relatives, friends and neighbors. These 
are the individuals with whom a farmer holds strong ties with, and is likely to exchange 
information and learn from. The average cumulative experiences of neighbors provide positive 
learning externalities or spillovers that impact positively on profit growth in an individual 
smallholder farm (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1985). 
Although social effects are important in decisions and actions of smallholder farmers 
(Gathiaka, 2010), literature on the subject is scant. In addition, many studies fail to control for 
social effects when estimating production functions or when calculating returns to farm inputs. 
This can introduce bias in the estimated returns (Kimenyi et al., 2006). Estimates of returns to 
farming have conventionally measured the marginal value product of an input (Randrianarisoa 
and Minten, 2001) and monetary returns for money invested (Farquharson, 2006). While these 
conventional measures are by all means useful, they may be biased because they ignore social 
interactions and externalities. For example, Farquharson (2006) in simulating wheat production 
response to fertilizer does not consider that fertilizer demand may be influenced by social 
interactions among farmers. 
Previous studies in Kenya have not taken into account the effect of social interactions in 
smallholder agricultural production (see for example, Nyangena and Kohlin, 2008; Kabubo-
Mariara, 2010; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010). There is need to investigate how input demand and 
European Scientific Journal          July edition vol. 8, No.15   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)    e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
183 
 
returns to farming behave in the presence of social interactions because these social phenomena 
are common in farm environments.  
This paper builds on available literature by focusing on a sample of smallholder farms in 
Kenya with regard to input demands and the returns to the inputs while paying due attention to 
social effects. The paper estimates parameters of input demand functions controlling for social 
interactions. Social interactions are proxied by average neighborhood variables of fertilizer 
usage, animal feeds usage, conservation efforts, soil ridging practices, grass stripping efforts and 
property rights bundles.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses materials and 
methods employed in the paper. It also shows the empirical model followed in this paper to 
estimate demand for farm inputs and returns to the inputs in smallholder farms while controlling 
for social interactions. Part three presents and discusses the estimation results. The last part 
summarizes the paper and draws policy conclusions.   
2.0 Materials and Methods 
 The data for this paper were collected from Nyeri County in Central Province of Kenya 
between July and September 2007. This County was purposively selected because it has 
smallholder farming as the dominant land use activity (Republic of Kenya, 1997; 2002). The unit 
of analysis was the household and the data were collected in face-to-face interviews with 
farmers. The questionnaire that was used asked questions on farm activities, inputs and their 
usage, land tenure, farm output, marketing, infrastructure, and soil conservation practices.  
 Sample selection was guided by the National Sample Survey and Evaluation Program 
(NASSEP) of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). NASSEP maps the whole 
country into enumeration areas (EAs) first, and then classifies them into clusters based on 
population density. A cluster contains between 50 and 150 households. Nyeri has three 
enumeration areas with 34 clusters, of which 24 are rural and 10 urban. One of the 10 urban 
clusters is classified as peri-urban because of its agricultural activities. The sample was drawn 
from the 24 rural clusters and from the single peri-urban cluster so that the sampled households 
were spread across 25 clusters. The sampling frame was the households list. In each cluster, a 
sample of 17 households was systematically selected but in a random fashion to arrive at the 
desired sample size of 425 households, consistent with Yamane’s (1967) sample size formula. 
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2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Characteristics of Smallholder Households and Farms in Nyeri 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Head is male 0.76 0.43 0 1.0 
Age of household head 51.00 13.90 16 90 
Household size 4.30 1.75 1.0 9.0 
 
Highest level of education of head 
No education 0.13 0.34 0 1.0 
Primary 0.50 0.50 0 1.0 
Secondary 0.31 0.47 0 1.0 
Post-secondary 0.05 0.21 0 1.0 
Other 0.01 0.08 0 1.0 
HH head trained in agriculture 0.15 0.35 0 1.0 
 
Main occupation 
Farmer 0.59 0.49 0 1.0 
Casual employment 0.13 0.34 0 1.0 
General business 0.11 0.31 0 1.0 
Formal employment 0.08 0.26 0 1.0 
Other 0.04 0.20 0 1.0 
None 0.05 0.23 0 1.0 
 
Land ownership and mode of acquisition 
Average land holding per head 2.28 3.01 0.08 23 
Purchased 0.10 0.30 0 1.0 
Inherited 0.80 0.38 0 1.0 
Rented 0.01 0.07 0 1.0 
Other 0.07 0.26 0 1.0 
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Person registered on land title deed 
Father 0.47 0.50 0 1.0 
Head 0.36 0.48 0 1.0 
Other 0.17 0.15 0 1.0 
 
Tenure rights 
Land sale 0.44 0.50 0 1.0 
Bequeathing the land 0.40 0.50 0 1.0 
Renting the land 0.14 0.35 0 1.0 
Other land transactions 0.02 0.15 0 1.0 
 
Security of rights 
Unlikely to lose land ownership 0.80 0.40 0 1.0 
Other stakeholders on land 0.20 0.45 0 1.0 
 
 
Main crops 
Maize 0.91 0.28 0 1.0 
Beans 0.81 0.40 0 1.0 
Irish potatoes 0.56 0.50 0 1.0 
Bananas 0.33 0.47 0 1.0 
Coffee 0.41 0.49 0 1.0 
Horticultural crops 0.15 0.36 0 1.0 
Tea 0.15 0.35 0 1.0 
 
Harvested crop output per annum in kilograms 
Maize  304.41 391.77 0 3240 
Beans  116.96 231.56 0 1920 
Irish potatoes  165.03 367.22 0 3500 
Bananas  12.9 44.22 0 620 
Coffee  367.35 843.25 0 9000 
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Horticultural crops  620.00 3018.08 0 40000 
Tea  694.68 7506.33 0 150000 
 
Quantity of selected farm inputs 
Family labor, person-days 137 154 0 954 
Hired labor, person-days 22.5     64.3 0 587 
Manure, kilograms 1,597     2,530 0 21,000 
Fertilizer, kilograms 45.9 72.6 0 600 
 
Erosion control practices 
Plot with some conservation 0.60 0.49 0 1.0 
Terraces 0.18 0.39 0 1.0 
Planted trees 0.03 0.17 0 1.0 
Ridging 0.20 0.39 0 1.0 
Grass strips 0.30 0.45 0 1.0 
Other practices 
(e.g., mulch, fallow, etc.) 
0.07 0.25 0 1.0 
 
Nature of the practices 
Short term investments 0.46 0.50 0 1.0 
Long term investments 0.54 0.50 0 1.0 
 
Mineral addition practices 
Fertilizer use 0.17 0.37 0 1.0 
Manure use 0.17 0.38 0 1.0 
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Neighborhood variables 
Mean fertilizer usage in a village, 
kilograms 
46.0 27.45 2.31 130.06 
Mean of grass stripping practices at the 
village (1=stripping) 
0.287 0.157 0 0.5 
Mean of soil ridging practices at the 
village (1= ridging) 
0.185 0.145 0 0.5 
Common property rights regime in a 
village (1,2…n), where n = private 
2.955 0.537 1.438 4.2 
 
Distance to the nearest infrastructure in kilometers 
Market centre 3.0 2.44 .01 16 
All-weather road 1.67        2.20  0  15        
Tarmac road 4.18        4.89 .01         30 
Cooperative society 5.4 7.62 .01 60 
 
2.2 Empirical model 
In farm production, observable as well as unobservable inputs determine output level. 
While observable inputs are clearly understood and have a market value, unobservable inputs are 
not. Unobservable inputs may relate to a farmer’s own characteristics or to neighborhood 
behavior (with regard to production choices), exogenous attributes of the neighborhood and to 
personal characteristics of the neighbors. The linear-in-means model can capture the effect of 
observable as well as unobservable inputs in a production function. 
 
2.3 The linear-in-means model 
Following Halliday and Kwak (2007), Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and Fletcher (2010), 
the linear-in-means model was modified to show the crop output of farmer i in village s as 
follows:  
 Yis = a0 + a1Xi + a2 is + a4Fi + a4Wi + a5Vi i……………………… (1) 
where, 
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 Yis = output of farmer i in village s 
 Xi = endogenous input used by farmer i (e.g., fertilizer) 
is = vector of neighborhood variables in village s when farmer  
 i’s variable in same respect is  excluded 
 Fi = vector of farmer i’s observable characteristics or observed heterogeneity 
Wi = vector of other covariates of inputs demanded by farmer i 
Vis = village s fixed effects  
  ai= parameters  (i=0,1,…) 
 i = error term.   
 
is vector contained the variables of crop output, fertilizer usage, conservation efforts of 
soil ridging and grass stripping practices and property rights bundles measured at the village 
level. It was a proxy for social interactions. Xi is an endogenous input, say fertilizer. To estimate 
equation (1) while also addressing problem of endogeneity, Xi was instrumented (see Greene, 
1997). That is, demand fertilizer was predicted and the actual fertilizer variable in equation (1) 
was replaced with the predicted fertilizer demand. Predicting fertilizer demand involved 
estimating a fertilizer demand function with an exclusion restriction, namely, Cdi, the distance 
from a household to the nearest cooperative society. The effect of distance on fertilizer demand 
was hypothesized to be non-linear, and for this reason distance was included together with its 
square in the demand equation as in Thori and Mehlum (2010). 
 
The predicted fertilizer demand was a reduced form of equation of the form:  
= b1 + b2  + b3 Fi +  b4Wi + b5Vi + Cd fi ……………………………(2) 
where, 
  = amount of fertilizer used by farmer i in village s 
   = mean fertilizer used by farmer i’s neighbors in village s when farmer i’s  
  fertilizer usage is excluded    
    Fi = vector of farmer i’s observable characteristics      
    Vi = village s fixed effects  
   Cdi = distance to the cooperative society nearest to farmer i 
    bi = parameters  to be estimated (i=1,2…) 
   fi = error term  
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3.0 Results and Discussion 
3.1 Demand for Fertilizer 
Four specifications of fertilizer demand, each with a different neighborhood variable of 
social interaction were estimated. Results are shown in Table 2. The characteristics of the 
household head and social interactions at the village level were the control variables.   
 
Table 2: First Stage Regression– Demand for Fertilizer (t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Variables OLS Estimates 
 
Factor Inputs 
Capital , index 2.664(1.36) 2.081(1.03) 1.804(0.89) 1.805(0.90) 
Labor, person days .043(2.25) .034(1.71) .034(1.69) .039(1.95) 
Land, hectares .268(0.23) -.451(0.38) .200(0.17) -.228(0.19) 
 
Farmer and Neighborhood Characteristics 
Age, years .526(0.33) -.203(0.12) -.303(0.18) -.409(0.25) 
Age
2
 .034(0.23) -.735(0.00) .001(0.03) .002(0.11) 
Education, level 3.632(0.76) 3.362(0.69) 3.167(0.64) 4.048(0.83) 
Mean fertilizer usage in a 
village, kilograms 
 
.675(5.42) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Mean of soil ridging 
practices (1= ridging)  
 
- 
 
55.781(2.30) 
 
- 
 
- 
Mean of grass stripping 
practices (1=stripping) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
31.474(1.37) 
 
- 
Common property rights 
regime in a village (1,2…n), 
where n = private 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
-17.214(2.68) 
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Exclusion Restrictions  
Distance to a cooperative 
society 
 
-3.603(3.75) 
 
-3.396(3.41) 
 
-3.570(3.58) 
 
-3.510(3.55) 
Distance to a cooperative 
society squared 
 
.097(4.55) 
 
.095(4.35) 
 
.098(4.45) 
 
.093(4.23) 
     
 
Constant 
 
28.389(0.67) 
 
45.529(1.04) 
 
50.896(1.16) 
 
111.047(2.35) 
R
2
 .125 0.0739 0.066 0.079 
F-statistic  [p-value] 6.550[0.000] 3.65[0.000] 3.25[0.001] 3.93[0.000] 
Root MSE 68.619 70.644 70.933 70.404 
Observations 423 423 423 423 
 
The estimation results show that fertilizer demand is positively associated with labor and 
neighborhood variables, proxied by the means of fertilizer usage, soil conservation efforts and 
property rights within a village. An increase in labor endowment at the household by one person-
day is associated with an increase in fertilizer application on a plot of 0.043 kilograms. The 
social effects of fertilizer usage and soil ridging are positive. A rise in the mean fertilizer usage at 
the village level by one kilogram encourages an observing farmer within the village to increase 
his own fertilizer usage by close to 0.7 of a kilogram. This finding is suggestive of social 
learning among farmers and of positive social information externalities within the village. 
An increase in distance to the nearest cooperative society reduces demand for fertilizer. 
For every kilometer increase in distance to a cooperative society, a farmer reduces the annual 
demand for fertilizer by 3 kilograms. Long distances to cooperative societies which are the main 
sources for farm inputs in rural areas discourage fertilizer usage. 
A unit change in the property rights regime in the direction of private ownership reduces 
fertilizer demand by 17 kilograms. In smallholder agriculture farmers often use organic manure 
rather than inorganic fertilizer when they are certain of using a plot for a long period of time. Use 
of manure is advantageous in that soil fertility and water retention lasted for a longer period. The 
results suggested that private rights regimes reduced plot level application of fertilizers. 
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The same analysis was performed as in Table 2, but entering the basic farm inputs into 
the fertilizer demand equation separately in an attempt to control for any multicollinearity among 
them. The results were the same as in Table 2 showing that multicollinearity was not a problem 
in this specification. 
  Characteristics of household heads did not influence demand for fertilizer in any 
systematic way. The result was consistent with Akwasi’s (2010) finding that household 
characteristics, including basic education do not affect fertilizer demand.  
 
3.2 Returns to farm inputs  
In crop production, some inputs are basic to all farmers while others are not. Every 
farmer uses some form of farm equipment, labor and land in production so that these factors are 
basic farm inputs. In contrast, only some of farmers use fertilizers. 
Table 3 presents estimated returns to farm inputs. The dependent variable is log of crop 
output in kilograms.  
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Table 1: Parameter Estimates of Crop Production Function (fertilizer is the endogenous input) 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable is Log Crop Output 
 
OLS Estimates 
IV-2SLS 
Estimates 
Control Function 
Estimates 
Factor Inputs 
Fam equipment, capital .056(3.21) .046(2.39) .046(2.55) 
Labor*10
-1
 .004(2.09) .002(1.00) .002(1.18) 
Land .024(2.39) .022(2.04) .023(2.26) 
Fertilizer*10
-1
 .006(1.38) .040(1.93) .045(2.27) 
 
Farmer and  Neighborhood Characteristics 
Age -.012(0.82) -.010(0.65) -.009(0.67) 
Age
2
*10
-1
 .001(0.85) .001(0.71) .001(0.73) 
Education .013(0.31) -.006(0.13) -.008(0.19) 
Mean fertilizer used by neighbors 
within a village 
 
.005(4.54) 
 
.003(2.00) 
 
.003(1.68) 
 
Controls for Unobservables 
Reduced-form fertilizer residual - -     -.004(1.75) 
Fertilizer*reduced-form residual*10
-3
  - -     -.003(1.02) 
 
Constant 9.061(24.39) 9.017(22.53)    8.996(24.20) 
R
2
 0.1152 .    0.1244 
F-statistic 
[p-value] 
6.74 
[0.000] 
6.09 
[0.000] 
   5.86 
  [0.000] 
Root MSE .607 .652      .605 
Observations 423 423     423 
(Absolute t Statistics in Parentheses) 
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The OLS estimates show that controlling for neighborhood effects in fertilizer usage, 
returns to factor inputs with the exception of returns to fertilizer are statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. In IV-2SLS estimation, capital, land, fertilizer and mean fertilizer usage are the 
most important determinants of crop production. The latter results are more credible and indicate 
that controlling for endogeneity matters in estimations of returns to farm inputs. When 
endogeneity and the effects of village level fertilizer are accounted for, returns to fertilizer are 
estimated at 0.4 percent. The coefficient on reduced-form residual is statistically significant 
confirming that fertilizer is indeed endogenous to crop production. 
Since the coefficient on the reduced form fertilizer residual interacted with fertilizer 
variable is not statistically significant, heterogeneity is not a problem and thus, the control 
function estimates were not an improvement over the IV estimates. Multicollinearity among 
basic farm inputs is also not a problem in this specification. 
Fertilizer usage at the village influences individual farmer’s demand for fertilizer and this 
in turn influences crop yields.  Table 4 shows additional estimation results.  
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Table 4 Production effects of soil conservation and property rights (t- statistics in parentheses) 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable is Log Crop Output  
Soil ridging Grass strips Property rights 
Factor Inputs 
Capital .046(2.40) .038(2.12) .040(2.09) 
Labor*10
-2
 .016(0.84) .028(1.50) .013(0.69) 
Land .019(1.78) .013(1.23) .018(1.66) 
Fertilizer*10
-1
 .039(1.90) .029(1.53) .044(2.01) 
 
Farmer and  Neighborhood Characteristics 
Age -.008(0.55) -.009(0.60) -.008(0.50) 
Age
2
*10
-3
 .083(0.59) .097(0.73) .079(0.56) 
Education -.008(0.18) .008(0.19) -.014(0.30) 
Mean of soil ridging 
effort  by neighbors 
within a village (1=soil 
ridging) 
 
 
 
.431(1.74) 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
- 
Mean of grass stripping 
efforts  by neighbors 
within a village 
 
 
- 
 
 
-.958(4.78) 
 
 
- 
Property rights held by 
neighbors in a village 
 
- 
 
- 
 
.176(2.40) 
 
Constant 9.059(22.43) 9.407(24.43) 8.586(17.35) 
R
2
 . 0.080 . 
F-statistic  [p-value] 4.380[0.000] 6.080[0. 000] 3.59[0.001] 
Root MSE .652 .619 .661 
Observations 423 423 423 
 Village level soil conservation efforts have mixed effects on returns. While average soil 
ridging in a village has a positive effect on returns, grass stripping has a negative effect. In either 
case, the coefficients on social interaction variables are significant indicating evidence of social 
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effects. Soil ridging efforts in a village are positively associated with higher levels of crop 
production. A 10 percentage increase in the proportion of farmers engaged in this practice is 
associated with an increase in crop output of 4.31 percent. The result suggests that there are 
positive production social effects in a village stemming from farmers that practice soil ridging. 
This finding contrasts with the case of grass stripping, where estimates show that when grass 
stripping by neighbors increases, crop output on individual plots declines. 
Soil ridging by neighbor farmers effectively checks soil erosion leading to positive 
externalities to non-conserving farmers and raising plot level productivity. In contrast, depending 
on how they are constructed, grass strips may not be effective in controlling soil erosion, and 
erosion downstream during heavy rains may occur in spite of their presence. This may lower 
productivity in the eroded farms. 
Further, if a farmer observes his neighbors’ grass strips and plants the same in his farm, 
the strips may compete for space with crops and reduce yields. This however might be a short-
run result because in the long run, the grass strips control erosion and crop output may increase. 
Existing studies show that soil conservation is a boost to crop production (Kabubo-Mariara, 
2010; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010) 
 The property rights held by neighbors tended to private ownership of land. Private 
ownership bestowed on plot owners “full” or “complete” land rights bundle, i.e., right of access, 
right of withdrawal, right of management, right of exclusion and right of alienation (Demsetz, 
1967). The social effect of these property rights on demand for fertilizer was negative but 
positive in the case of crop production. As already noted farmers tended to apply manure in plots 
that they were sure to cultivate for a long time and this had several benefits that increased yields. 
Secure property rights have been observed to encourage more investments by way of inputs thus 
affecting yields (Kabubo-Mariara, 2007; 2010; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010). 
If the prevalent land tenure in a neighborhood is private property, it may, under certain 
assumptions suggest that most farmers have the incentive to practice good farming techniques 
and to invest in conservation (Fenske, 2011). A farmer in a neighborhood no matter his tenure 
system receives spillover benefits in form of demonstration effects. For a given level of inputs, 
productivity can be expected to be higher due to demonstration effects of good farming practices. 
A private land tenure system creates positive social effects while common property and poorly 
defined regimes may be associated with negative social effects.  
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Information on responsiveness of crop output to changes in factor inputs is important in 
policy formulation. It is useful in making decisions regarding optimal factor inputs. The section 
that follows looks at the issue of the elasticity of crop output with respect to factor inputs, 
highlighting the policy value of the relationship. 
 
3.3 Crop output elasticities 
Table 5 presents estimates of the responsiveness of crop output to changes in factor 
inputs and to neighborhood variables based on results reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Table 0  Elasticities of Crop Output  
Variable Elasticity 
Farm equipment 0.081 
Labor 0.048 
Land 0.060 
Fertilizer usage, own farm 0.206 
Fertilizer usage by neighbors 0.131 
Grass stripping by neighbors 0.272 
Soil ridging by neighbors 0.078 
Property rights  0.508 
  
Crop output is inelastic with respect to changes in the factor inputs and to variations in 
neighborhood variables. This is a pointer to low demand for inputs at the farm level. With regard 
to land, the results suggest that soils are over cultivated without adequately replenishing lost soil 
nutrients. Thus, an increase in cultivated area does not automatically translate to higher crop 
yields. 
The poor response of crop output to changes in fertilizer suggests that the amounts of 
fertilizer used in the farms are too low such that any increases in the amount used do not reach 
the threshold of nutrients required for healthy plant growth. This is consistent with the findings 
of Kelly (1995) in a study of fertilizer application in smallholder farms in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and those of Jha and Hojjati (1993) with regard to the same in Zambia. 
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The capital equipments in the smallholder farms studied are rudimentary and any change 
in their demand could not make any change on crop yield. Without proper complementary 
inputs, any change in labor demand could also not change crop yield. 
In smallholder agriculture in the studied area family labor, traditional seeds and farming 
methods (e.g., hand digging) dominate. Timely land preparation and weeding using a hand hoe is 
difficult. The quantities of fertilizer used particularly on food crops are quite low or none at all as 
was observed in most of the farms. Agriculture in these smallholder farms was largely rain-
dependent and crop response was bound to be poor in the cases of rain failure.  
Due to low response of output to changes in inputs, a decline in, say, wage rate relative to 
crop output price cannot attract significant labor on the farm (Hayami, 1969). Low crop response 
discourages increased input usage at the farm level. 
In smallholder agriculture, as land becomes scarce, and as the price of fertilizer relative to 
price of land continues to decline, the use of fertilizer and of fertilizer-responsive crops 
particularly the high breed varieties can be expected to increase. Factor substitution can be 
encouraged along the isoquant of a meta-production function as happened in Japan (Hayami, 
1969). 
With a fixed supply of land, opportunities for higher yields from land lie in combining it 
with factors that push up crop production functions, such as fertilizer. This is a prudent farming 
strategy because crop elasticity with respect to land is 0.06, compared with a fertilizer elasticity 
of 0.206 percent. Crop increments are highest for investments in grass strips, but their 
productivity benefits seem to lie in the future. Crop expansion also responds strongly to property 
rights that give farmers complete control of their plots.  
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4.0 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the extent to which village-level variables influence farm 
decisions regarding inputs usage, and how social interactions affect returns to inputs in 
smallholder agriculture in Kenya. Towards this end, parameters of farm input demand functions 
and farm production functions were estimated controlling for the effects of social interactions.  
Smallholder farmers operate in a social context. Using fertilizer as special case of more 
general situations, the paper shows that social interactions matter in smallholder agriculture. 
Beegle and Dercon (2007) found similar results in their study of banana growing in Tanzania. 
Social interactions directly influence demand for inputs and have large impacts on returns to 
inputs at the plot level. The effect of the social interactions on an individual farmer (through 
social learning and peer pressure) is evident, but the paper was unable to separate out the the two 
effects. Usage of farm inputs is correlated with property rights regime at the village level. The 
dominant property rights regime in a village and soil conservation significantly influences crop 
production.  
The property rights that give farmers ownership of their plots are associated with 
increases in crop production. Although property rights go beyond mere possession of title deeds, 
these documents may be necessary for long-term investments in soil conservation. Easing the 
legal and regulatory framework to enable households acquire property rights would improve soil 
conservation practices and raise farm output. 
Farm output in smallholder agriculture is inelastic with respect to changes in farm inputs. 
This finding suggests that farm inputs would have to increase considerably before appreciable 
increases in farm output can be noticed. With declining land holdings and productivity in 
smallholder agriculture, farmers can gain a lot by using inputs that are known to raise output, the 
prime examples being fertilizers and improved land husbandry practices.  
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